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Abstract 
 The paper explores the driving forces behind corporate cash holdings by 
analyzing past literature and extending this research to the behavior of firms after the 
2008 recession. I look at the cash to assets and net debt to assets ratios from October 
1980 to October 2011 to obtain an understanding of the past and current state of cash 
holdings. A comprehensive literature review is done on agency costs and transactional 
motives to give the reader an overview of the costs and benefits of holding cash. This 
provides the foundation for the precautionary motives for companies today to keep cash 
as a risk management tool.  
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Since the 2008 recession, significant media attention has been paid to the large 
cash holdings of US corporations. According to The Wall Street Journal, nonfinancial 
companies in 2010 had $1.84 trillion on their books, a 26 percent increase from the prior 
year.1 Reporters and scholars both argue that the recession has led to a behavioral change 
to hold more cash. This is because the economic downturn had revealed the lack of 
liquidity and the inability of even large companies to repay debt or purchase inventory. 
Later on 29 July 2011, BBC news reported that Apple had reached a point in which it 
held more cash than the US government. Apple’s financials showed a cash balance of 
$76.8 billion while the US Treasury Department reported cash reserves of $73.7 billion.2 
But more surprisingly, Apple’s mountain of cash was not formed in response to the 
financial crisis. Instead even before late 2008, the high demand of Apple products had 
allowed it to increase its cash holdings from $12 billion in 2006 to $28 billion in 2008.3 
Therefore, the recent build-up of large cash reserves must be explained by more than 
simply a precautionary measure.  
 In Thomas Bates’ Why do US Firms Hold so Much More Cash than They Used 
to?, he takes the average cash to assets ratio for US industrial firms from 1980 to 2006. 
The findings concluded that the average cash ratio more than doubles from 10.5% to 
23.2% over the sample period.4 This evidence reinforces the fact that the recent increase 
in cash holdings is not recent at all. Instead, this trend has continued throughout history 
and stems from a far deeper explanation of the additional benefit of holding cash.  
                                            
1
 Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2010 
2
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3
 CNN, 23 Feb. 2009 
4
 Bates, pg 1985 
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In this paper, I seek to identify these factors through both analyses of current 
literature and my own thoughts on the determinants of corporate cash holdings. The paper 
will begin with a look at the costs and benefits for firms to hold cash. Then, it will cover 
more in-depth explanations derived from past findings and theories. After looking at 
these articles, I will develop my own take based on these arguments as well as through 
my own research. This study will exclude financial companies and all mentions of firms 
will refer to nonfinancial ones. 
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What Does Cash Mean to a Company? 
Cash can often be defined as some form of currency used for the exchange of 
goods or services. Yet in an accounting sense, cash is a non-operating asset that every 
firm has on its books. To keep cash means liquidity for a company and the ability to pay 
back debt. It also gives a company the financial flexibility to make inventory purchases 
or even make strategic acquisitions. In addition, steady positive cash flows are viewed 
positively by investors and lenders as a sign of a stable company. However, having 
money just sitting in the bank also means a decrease in value due to the time value of 
money. A company may also miss out on investing in positive net present value projects 
that will improve and grow the company. Therefore, hoarding cash is a sign that 
management may be extremely conservative, which is not necessarily beneficial unless 
the company is strategically waiting to make a large purchase. On a macroeconomic level 
when companies do not invest, there are fewer jobs and less demand for products. As a 
result, less consumption will cause the economy to remain stagnant. Even if interest rates 
fall, we can see that today’s companies are not actively taking on debt since they already 
have cash on their books to fund projects.  
A simple solution to large cash holdings would be to start issuing dividends to 
shareholders. Yet this would also place pressures on management to consistently pay 
shareholders on a going forward basis. A sudden stoppage in dividends is often seen as a 
negative sign and will cause stock prices to fall. Therefore, companies are unwilling to 
begin issuing dividends and would rather sit on cash.  
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According to Keynes, the three motives for individuals to hold cash are for 
“precautionary, transactional, and speculative purposes.”5 These can be seen as some of 
the main operational reasons for why businesses hold cash. However, the relationship 
between managers and shareholders creates an added dynamic.  
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The Agency Problem and Free Cash Flow Theory 
 The interests of managers and shareholders are often at odds with each other. 
While shareholders focus on ownership and stock value, managers often look to grow the 
company and increase sales numbers, which determine the amount of compensation 
received and potential promotions. When the question of cash is presented to this 
situation, managers have the choice of investing these resources or holding onto them, 
creating the perfect scenario for value destruction. Adam Smith best characterizes it, 
“negligence and profusion, therefore, must prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such compan[ies].”6 Therefore, the issue of corporate cash holdings has 
risen as increased free cash flow has given management access to substantial amounts of 
capital that can be used at their discretion. Managers have essentially the following three 
options: issue dividends, begin share buybacks, or purchase other companies. On one 
hand as discussed previously, dividends are not in the interest of managers since this 
creates the pressure of having consistent payouts. On the other hand, shareholders do not 
necessarily want share buybacks since they are losing ownership in a company and on 
future stock price increases. Good acquisitions will benefit both managers and 
shareholders, but these purchases actually hurt the company more often than not as we 
will see in later discussion. Hence, the agency problem arises as entrenched managers 
may make decisions that can significantly impact the company without shareholder input. 
This leads to the free cash flow theory, which “predicts that mergers and takeovers are 
more likely to destroy, rather than to create, value.”7 As a result, there have been 
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extensive studies on the relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings to 
find solutions to avoid losses caused by taking on bad investments.  
 Michael Jenson’s Agency Costs of Free cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers presents a solution to motivate managers to spend their cash effectively rather 
than wasting it on negative net present value projects. Such projects are taken on since 
the abundant cash on a company’s books decreases the cost of financing, resulting in a 
lower discount rate. Therefore, a previously bad investment may suddenly seem like a 
great option. Yet often times, these projects are riskier and do not benefit the company.  
Jenson proposes debt as a way to replace problems caused by dividends and disgorge 
managers of cash. Promises of permanent increases in dividends are often very weak 
since these dividends can be easily reduced in the future.8 These decreases are then 
viewed negatively by capital markets, which cause stock prices to fall significantly. 
Therefore, Jenson suggests the issuance of debt in exchange for stock from shareholders. 
This practice not only ensures the future payments of free cash flows to shareholders, but 
also incentives managers to act in the interest of the company. “The threat caused by 
failure to make debt service payments serves as an effective motivating force to make 
such organizations more efficient.”9 Such a proposal must be enforced by a company’s 
board of directors to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. An additional advantage 
of repurchasing stock for debt or cash is the tax shield generated from interest payments 
and “that part of the repurchase proceeds equal to the seller’s tax basis in the stock is not 
taxed at all.”10 Nevertheless, this plan has its limits as increased leverage can benefit a 
company to a certain point. If the optimal capital structure is reached, any point past this 
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would cause the company to become more risky and less likely to obtain financing. As a 
result, this proposal would be most ideal in firms with large cash flows but low growth 
since these firms are most prone to investing in unprofitable ventures in an attempt to 
expand. In all, Jenson identifies that entrenched management and weak shareholder rights 
often results in high cash holdings, which can be detrimental to firm value.  
 This correlation between weak shareholder protection and increased cash holdings 
is expanded upon in Ivalina Kalcheva’s International Evidence on Cash Holdings and 
Expected Managerial Agency Problems. The paper does a regression analysis with the 
cash to asset ratio as the dependent variable and has various independent variables 
including ownership, shareholder rights, and managerial control. It looks at 
approximately 5,000 firms from 31 different countries and finds “moderate…evidence 
that entrenched managers hold more cash and that this relation is stronger when country-
level external shareholder protection is weak.”11 This is largely due to managerial 
entrenchment, which is measured in three ways by Kalcheva. First, it looks at the 
percentage of rights held by the management group and its family. The second way takes 
into consideration the votes held by other blockholders by creating a dummy variable, 
which is equal to one if the management group and its family is the largest blockholder of 
a firm’s control rights. The final measurement is also a dummy variable that is set to one 
if the management’s control rights exceed 20 percent and is greater in size than all of the 
blockholder rights.12 The interaction between these variable produced a positive 
coefficient that was statistically significant. However, the R squared for these regressions 
was fairly low, so only around 15 percent of the variation in cash holdings is explained 
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 Kalcheva, pg 8 
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by variation in managerial control. Kalcheva goes even more in depth by looking at the 
perceived value of cash when there is poor shareholder protection. The tests show that an 
“incremental dollar held inside an average firm has a marginal value of $0.76 to outside 
shareholders, unless managers are the largest blockholder, in which case the dollar is 
discounted to $0.39.”13 This proves that a company with great amounts of cash but 
entrenched management may not be valued as highly as a company with less cash but 
stronger shareholder rights. Management may think that holding more cash gives them 
more control, but they do not see this loss in value.  
 Henock Louis’ Value of Cash Holdings and Accounting Conservatism looks at the 
overall market value of an additional dollar in cash holdings with increases in accounting 
conservatism. Examining the value of cash holdings is just as important as tracking how 
much cash a company has. This is because a firm may very well be keeping large 
amounts of cash in order to compensate for its low market to book value of cash. 
According to Louis, this value changes with variations in accounting conservatism. He 
produces a regression model with the dependent variable as abnormal stock return and 
among the independent variables are change in cash and two proxies for conservatism. 
CON-AC is the “negative of the ratio of nonoperating accruals to total assets cumulate 
over the previous three years.” CON-CR is a conditional conservatism ratio developed by 
Callen, Segal, and Hope (2010) and that “measures the percentage of a shock to total 
current and future earnings recognized in current period earnings.”14 These two measures 
are a good representation of conservatism since they look at a company’s reporting 
policies and managerial discretion. Both CON-AC and CON-CR produced a positive 
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relationship between accounting conservatism and market value of cash. Louis argues 
that these findings confirm that conservatism can serve as a form of external monitoring 
that can ease the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.15 Thus, 
conservatism creates a self-check since managers have to follow corporate policies that 
closely monitor the use of cash and prevents value destroying investments. An additional 
finding is that cash holdings actually increase as conservatism is added to the regression 
model. This may seem counter-intuitive at first since cash with higher value means that a 
company can hold less of it. However, conservatism also means that shareholders trust 
management more in their decisions, so more cash can be safely left in the hands of 
managers. Meanwhile, although managers may be more conservative, they still seek to 
maximize sales and growth in order to receive more compensation.  
 Therefore, we now look at Yixin Liu’s Corporate Cash Holdings and CEO 
Compensation Incentives to find the relationship between the level of cash and 
management incentives. On paper, management’s goal should be to maximize 
shareholder value and equity-based compensation should reinforce this objective. 
However, Liu identifies that the side effect of such practices is that managers will take on 
risky positions in order to increase the market value of equity at the expense of 
bondholders.16 In order to see the effect on cash, data is first collected on the sensitivity 
of a CEO’s own-firm wealth to change in stock price and stock price volatility. This 
forms a variable called vega, which is a measure of a CEO’s risk-taking incentive. 
Controlling for firm characteristics and corporate governance, Liu is able to find a 
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positive relationship between vega and cash holdings.17 One explanation for this 
relationship is the fact that higher risk taking may make debt more expensive, causing the 
company to hold more cash to fund future projects. Liu calls this the “costly external 
finance hypothesis,” which results in debt holders requiring liquidity covenants.18 Thus, a 
cash cushion is required to hedge the risky ventures entered by managers and create a 
more reasonable capital structure. Another reason for the cash build-up is the “costly 
contracting hypothesis.”19 Liu claims that bondholders require firms to have excess cash 
holdings to serve as a reserve for potential losses from bad investments. Thus, equity 
compensation drives managers to take on more risk and grow the company. This risk-
taking propensity or vega forces the managers to keep more cash on their books in order 
to maintain their current practices without damaging the firm. Overall, there is an indirect 
relationship between managerial compensation and cash holdings.  
Gary Powell’s Management Views on Corporate Cash Holdings offers some 
unique insight on this issue through a survey of CFOs in 1,000 large US companies and 
their opinion on corporate cash holdings. This study was done in 2009 using three 
questions providing background information, 27 closed-end statements on the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings, and 12 statements on the effects of corporate 
governance on cash holdings.20 The CFO’s then choose from one of the following 
answers: strongly disagree (-2), disagree (-1), undecided (0), agree (1), and strongly agree 
(2). These responses are assigned values in order to obtain a mean and rank for each 
statement. This method not only provides a numerical response, but also creates a fairly 
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objective viewpoint since the CFOs are asked about their perception of large, publicly-
held US companies as a whole. The first significant result was that 72 percent of 
managers agree or strongly agree with the statement: 
“Firms strive to hold optimal levels of cash that trade off the opportunity cost of 
holding too much cash against the trading costs of holding too little.”21  
This may seem like a very reserved position by managers since they only wish to keep as 
much cash as needed to pay back debt or buy inventory. Yet, 72 percent of the managers 
also generally agree that: 
“Firms with greater uncertainty in their future cash flows tend to hold more cash 
to prevent underinvestment in profitable projects and firms with abundant 
investment opportunities hold higher levels of cash to insulate future capital 
expenditures from the variability of internally generated cash flows.”22  
These answers reinforce our previous discussion of the conservatism factor among 
managers. They do not simply hold an optimal level of cash since that is almost 
impossible to identify. Instead, managers keep as much cash as they think the company 
will need and a little more on top of that to ensure liquidity. Managers expressed the most 
disagreement with the following two statements even though they were statistically 
significant at the .01 level: 
“Firms with higher levels of managerial ownership tend to hold higher levels of 
cash; firms hold excess cash balances to avoid the disciplining effects from the 
capital markets that may accompany raising funds externally.”23  
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It is quite interesting that managers would vote these statements down when empirical 
evidence from previous literature begs to differ. Managers may have responded 
negatively to the first since this is more of a personal question as they do not want to be 
accused of hoarding cash, which is understandable. However, it is strange that they would 
deny the costly debt financing they would have to face if interest rates fluctuated. 
Nevertheless, their reasoning could be that their motive for holding cash would be for 
future investments as the previous statements they expressed agreement with pointed out. 
Therefore, the type of questions being asked here may have altered the responses or 
suggested a more accurate answer in some cases. 
The second part of Powell’s survey focused on the corporate governance effects 
on cash holdings. The responses to this section of the study are more in line with the 
findings by past scholars.  
“About 66% of the responding managers generally agree with the statement that 
entrenched managers are more likely to accumulate large, unused cash stockpiles 
than managers of firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms.”24 
The support for this statement reinforces our discussion of Kalcheva’s paper and 
identifies the problem with entrenched managers. The percentage that is in agreement 
with this statement may seem lower, but it is the most highly-ranked one in this part of 
the survey. The majority of the CFOs being surveyed responded positively since this 
question is phrased in such a way that the “entrenched managers” seem to be describing a 
completely different demographic of managers. Therefore, the respondents disassociate 
themselves from this group and are more willing to agree with this statement. The study 
goes on to report that 63% of managers agreed with the next statement: “Firms with 
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stronger corporate governance mechanisms that protect investors tend to hold smaller 
cash balances.”25 Again, we can see that both managers and scholars have a similar view 
that corporate governance is a strong determinant of cash holdings. Powell’s study brings 
a new perspective to this discussion, which has been dominated by scholarly articles and 
theories. It reaffirms some of the pre-established notions, yet also brings in new insights 
on how managers feel about the topic. An interesting finding is that although firms with 
stronger corporate governance hold less cash, growing firms are expected to have higher 
levels of cash as long as there are governance mechanisms that protect investors’ 
interests.26 This creates an added dynamic since there has been evidence that more cash 
holdings are a result of poor governance.  
 The above literature gives us a good understanding of how the quality of 
management and controls in place can affect corporate cash holdings. The agency 
problem and free cash flow theory do generate substantial concern over value destroying 
investments and the discretion of management. However, we can see that effective 
corporate governance can limit these risks and allow companies to potentially achieve an 
optimal level of cash. The incentives and motivations for managers also play a large part 
since certain compensation methods and lack of monitoring can prove to be costly. It 
seems like managers are like misbehaving children, who left on their own terms shall 
surely cause problems. Cash is the trust shareholders place with these individuals to 
manage as long as they behave. Therefore, a strong board of directors must be in place to 
discipline the managers through policing and rules that should become more stringent as 
cash holdings rise.  
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Operational Motives 
 Companies need liquidity to function, but they will also keep cash for a variety of 
strategic reasons. Shareholder rights or management motives do not matter since these 
are conscious decisions approved by the board to take in order to gain a competitive 
advantage in the market. Cash gives a company the ability to be flexible in making 
decisions and is frequently the easiest solution to problems. If there was as sudden fire 
that destroyed a store of a retail company, this company would not have to wait for 
money from insurance and have the ability to quickly rebuild. Otherwise, the company 
would have to seek out debt financing, which will be considerably more expensive since 
debt results in both interest payments and more leverage that can increase the riskiness of 
the overall firm. A company with readily available cash can not only take advantage in 
such a situation, but it can also have a competitive edge if it was bidding over an 
acquisition. As a result, we can see how important cash is to all kinds of businesses. 
However, there are several more reasons why companies today are holding an exorbitant 
amount of cash.  
 Aswath Damodaran’s Dealing with Cash Cross Holdings, and Other Non-
operating Assets: Approaches and Implications outlines a variety of key motives for cash 
reserves. First, the type of business determines the cash needs of a company. Retail stores 
are required to be more liquid in order to constantly purchase inventory to adjust for the 
cyclicality of demand. A service-based company will not have to hold as much cash since 
its main expense would be the salaries that occur on a scheduled basis. Damodaran also 
emphasizes the difference between cash oriented versus credit oriented businesses.27 This 
explanation brings about the opportunity to highlight the trends on the credit policies of 
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today’s companies. In the past, large retailers offered their own rewards card, which 
served as a credit card as well. These cards were widely promoted until the retailers 
realized the added costs and risks associated with credit cards as their bad debts 
increased. Therefore, fewer stores now offer such services and rely on more traditional 
credit card companies. This gives companies the ability to have a minimal receivables 
account as they immediately obtain cash on purchases. As a result, the decreasing trend 
of credit-granting stores adds to the increase in cash holdings today. The second 
transactional motive lies with precautionary holdings by managers to shield against 
unexpected charges. Damodaran agrees with scholars that the current recession plays a 
large factor as a volatile economy will induce managers to hold onto cash and have the 
ability to face sudden swings in the market.28 Emphasis is also given to the operational 
and competitive environment of these companies. Companies with uncertain free cash 
flows are more likely to have more cash. Technology companies, which fall into this 
category, “often have large cash balances precisely because they are so uncertain about 
their future earnings.”29 Thus, Apple can now justify their large cash holdings because 
earnings in the technology sector are more volatile. In addition, competition may force 
firms to hold more cash since there is increased pressure on supplier options and market 
dominance. Third, strategically holding cash for future investments provides company 
with the option to take on projects that they otherwise would not be able to fund. “Firms 
will set aside cash to cover future investment needs; if they fail to do so, they run the risk 
of turning away worthwhile investments.”30 As a result, companies that face more 
expensive capital markets and limited financing options choose to keep more cash. These 
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companies are often smaller businesses that are in emerging markets since such 
companies have lower credit scores and very little established reputation. Moreover, 
capital will be harder to generate if there is asymmetric information where “external 
investors have less information about the potential payoffs than the firm does.31 This 
explains why R&D intensive firms will have more cash since lenders have difficulty 
assessing the probability of a successful project. However, most of these companies will 
not simply have an equity dominated capital structure since this makes them lose out on 
the tax benefits of debt. They must weigh the costs and benefits before an optimal 
balance of debt and equity is achieved. In all, market movements have a good deal of 
influence on management’s decision to retain cash, yet a company’s tax policies must 
also be looked at.  
Why do Firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation by C. Fritz Foley 
investigates the effect of repatriation taxes on cash stashes overseas. US multinationals 
choose to keep their earnings overseas in low tax countries in order to avoid having to 
pay high tax costs of repatriating these funds to the US. The US obligates these 
companies to pay taxes on foreign income, but grants tax credits for foreign income taxes 
paid abroad. “Taxes due upon repatriation are equal to the difference between foreign 
income taxes paid and the tax payments that would be due if earnings were taxed at the 
US rate.”32 Therefore, there is no incentive for multinationals to repatriate their cash 
promptly unless there is a sudden liquidity crunch. These earnings are placed in low tax 
jurisdictions in order to avoid foreign income taxes. Foley’s regression output concludes 
that “one standard deviation increase in tax costs associated with repatriations is 
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associated with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets.”33 This supports past 
literature that repatriation taxes play a big factor in influencing companies to hold onto 
cash. In addition, “the median firm facing an above average repatriation tax burden holds 
47% of its cash abroad, but the median firm facing a below average repatriation tax 
burden holds only 26% of its cash abroad.”34 Companies with incorporated affiliates in 
foreign nations choose to leave this cash overseas despite having their main operations in 
the US. This is a cause for concern for the US government since less domestic investment 
would occur due to costs of repatriation. Therefore, in 2004, President George W. Bush 
approved a tax repatriation holiday through the American Job Creation Act.35 This 
allowed companies to bring back their cash for a comparably lower tax rate than usual. 
Billions of dollars were sent back by companies, yet the results were the not quite what 
the government had hoped for. Instead of having a dramatic increase in investing that 
would stimulate the economy, companies used these funds to reward managers or buy 
back shares. As a result, there has been little support for another tax repatriation holiday, 
and multinationals seem to be happy to keep their cash in tax havens. Foley also suggests 
that technology companies are extremely sensitive to repatriation taxes and more often 
move funds to low-tax jurisdictions. “Technology intensive firms typically have high 
profit margins and intangible assets like intellectual property that are easy to transfer 
within the firm.”36 This means that a company like Apple would be able to have its 
foreign affiliates purchase intellectual property from its parent before the project is 
successful. Thus, Apple can avoid taxes on profitable R&D ventures through these 
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loopholes. Foley’s findings strengthen the argument that multinationals hold larger 
amounts of cash to avoid triggering repatriation taxes. Overall, companies must decide 
whether keeping so much cash on their books actually minimizes their tax exposure.  
Scholars have repeatedly suggested the use of dividends as a solution, yet Eugene 
F. Fama contends that dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. Fama’s 
Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay? 
studies the changing nature of companies as well as their dividend payout policies. 
Although the paper only covers dividend payers from 1926 to 1999, its trends and 
findings are representative of why companies today have increasing levels of cash. Data 
from NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms show that the percent of dividend payers reach 
a peak of 66.5 percent in 1978 but falls to only 20.8 percent in 1999.37 The changing 
characteristics of newly listed firms play a great factor in this trend. IPOs have 
traditionally been small firms with high asset growth rates, but what changes in 1999 is 
the profitability. Earnings of new lists amount to only 2.07 percent of book equity from 
1993-1998 while other firms reported earnings of 11.26 percent.38 As a result, this 
deterioration in profitability has led firms to pay less or even no dividends. In fact, only 
3.7 percent of new lists paid dividends in 1999 and an average of 5 percent of previous 
payers stopped paying each year during 1978-99.39 This shows that not only was there a 
decline in payers, but also a lack of new payers to replace them. Therefore, companies in 
general were seeing less value in paying dividends and more value in holding cash. Past 
research has shown that the tax disadvantage of dividends has convinced firms to 
increase share repurchases as a substitute for dividends. Share repurchases generate lower 
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taxed capital gains for stockholders but still require a cash payout. Fama argues that 
repurchases do not simply serve as a substitute, but instead they are used by current 
dividend payers to increase already high cash payouts.40 This point is important as these 
dividend paying firms account for 23.6 percent of the firms yet account for 91.7 percent 
of common stock earnings.41 Therefore, this may skew the results to show that nonpayers 
utilize share buybacks instead of dividends when actually dividend payers account for 
most of the share buybacks. This may lead to speculation that these nonpayers are mostly 
low-profit firms that cannot pay out dividends. However, Fama indicates that “the surge 
in unprofitable non-paying new lists in the 1980s and 1990s keeps the aggregate profits 
of non-payers low even though the non-payer group includes an increasing fraction of 
firms with positive earnings – firms that in the past would pay dividends.”42 This proves 
that there is an overall lower propensity to pay dividends for more recent lists. As more 
new lists choose not to pay dividends, such behavior can be seen as a change in 
characteristics of firms and an increase in the inclination to keep more cash. Therefore, 
this transformation of company policy to cease paying dividends has continued today and 
is one of the key reasons for large cash holdings.  
Taking a look at these past studies allows us to break down why companies have 
chosen to keep cash despite the potential problems and risks associated with agency 
costs. Recent market volatility, repatriation taxes, and changing firm characteristics all 
play a large part in making firms choose to hold cash. Each motive derives its influence 
from firms trying to avoid earnings volatility as the costs of doing business have 
increased through time with more modern technology and operational risks.  
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Looking at the Cash Ratio and Net Debt 
An important and effect measure of cash holdings is the cash to assets ratio, 
which has been used by researchers to examine corporate cash holdings. Instead of 
simply looking at cash amounts, this ratio adjusts for the time value of money and gives 
us a better picture of the firm’s change in cash levels over time. Thomas Bates’ Why do 
US Firms Hold so Much More Cash than They Used To? takes a look at this ratio from 
1980 to 2006. His findings show a dramatic increase in cash holdings during this time 
period for non-dividend paying firms, recent IPO listing firms, and companies in 
industries with great idiosyncratic risk. These reasons all fall in line with previous 
literature and create more support that the increase in cash holdings is much more than a 
recent phenomenon. Running a regression shows a positive correlation between the cash 
ratio and time, reporting an increase of 0.46% per year.43 Bates’ findings report that the 
main reasons for this increase are that “inventories have fallen, cash flow risk for firms 
has increased, capital expenditures have fallen, and R&D expenditures have increased.”44 
These results point to Fama’s argument that firm characteristics have changed throughout 
the years. Companies choose to hold onto less inventory as they seek to hold more cash 
and have smoother earnings. R&D expenses are interesting since it is much more 
expensive to obtain external financing for these projects. This is because of the problem 
of asymmetric information, which makes the success of R&D questionable to debtors. 
Therefore, R&D intensive firms choose to have more cash as a form of internal financing. 
As Bates analyzes the cash ratio, he also makes a brief point about significance of the net 
debt to assets ratio, which I find very interesting.  
                                            
43
 Bates, pg 1985 
44
 Bates, pg 2018 
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I take a look at both the net debt and cash ratios and extend this research from 
October 1980 to October 2011 by using a sample from WRDS Compustat files. To form 
these ratios, I obtained data on total assets, cash and short-term investments, total debt in 
current liabilities, and total long-term debt. In addition, I dropped financial and real estate 
companies (SIC codes 5200-5399) since they hold large amounts of cash for capital 
requirements. Also, I removed utilities (SIC codes 2200-2399) because of set cash 
amounts due to regulation. Utilizing STATA software, I first found the cash ratio by 
dividing cash and short-term investments by total assets. Then, the net debt ratio was 
generated by first adding current liabilities and long-term debt to get total debt. Cash and 
short-term investments were then subtracted from this number, and the result was divided 
by total assets. Before calculating the mean and medians of these ratios, I winsorized the 
data to deal with any outliers that might skew my calculations. I only wanted 
winsorization of the bottom 1 percent and top 99 percent, which set any observations 
below the first percentile equal to the first percentile and anything above the 99th 
percentile equal to the 99th percentile. Looking at the mean gives us a fair assessment 
about the overall level of cash holdings. However, the median allows us to see if the data 
might have been skewed by a couple firms with extremely large cash holdings.  
Once I collapsed the data into means and medians for each year, I graphed the 
results in Graph A and Graph B. The cash to assets ratio is displayed in Graph A, 
which shows a substantial spike in recent years. The mean reaches close to 24 percent 
after hitting a low point of about 17 percent in 2008. This makes sense since many firms 
during the recession were hit hard and used up much of their liquidity to ride out the 
volatile markets. The difference between the mean and the median does indicate that a 
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few firms hold substantially more cash than others. However, the difference is 
insignificant for our purposes as the trend of the mean is approximately parallel to that of 
the mean. The net debt to assets ratio is shown in Graph B, and we can see a very 
pronounced decrease into the negatives in recent years. There is a build-up in net debt 
that hits a peak at around 12 percent in 2008 and then a sudden and very steep fall to 
around negative 4 percent in October 2011. The mean and median follow a very close 
path and have similar values. Despite there being fluctuations of net debt, the overall 
trend is still downward sloping, which verifies Bates’ findings. Net debt provides a better 
picture since it represents the true amount of excess cash a firm holds. This excess cash is 
more important than just the total amount of cash since this represents extra liquidity that 
is not obligated to any debt. Therefore, large cash holdings are insignificant if these 
amounts cannot cover its total debt. The phenomena we see today is that the average 
company holds cash amounts greater than its debt, which is the first instance since 1980 
according to data collected. This is the real reason for the extensive amount of media 
coverage on the amount of cash firms have on their books.  
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Conclusion  
 Corporate cash holdings have caused great concern for economists since the lack 
of spending has hurt the recovery of the US economy. However, the situation is not as 
simple since there has been a gradual increase of cash levels. Managers today choose not 
to issue dividends or buy back shares, following the non-payer trend identified by Fama. 
As more cash is available to the discretion of management, shareholders have to worry 
about value destroying investments that must be regulated through a conservative policy 
issued by the board of directors. Nevertheless, firms have carefully made the decision to 
hold cash as they try to avoid repatriation taxes and achieve an ideal capital structure. The 
most significant reason for holding cash after the 2008 recession is to keep it as a form of 
risk management. From the net debt ratios, we can see that companies are holding more 
cash than debt and effectively changing their capital structures. Risk management can be 
achieved through the use of financial instruments, operational changes, or modifying the 
capital structure. Today’s economy makes the use of derivatives quite risky and 
unpredictable. Adjusting operations can only achieve so much and is often very 
expensive. The best choice for companies seems to be holding more cash to hedge 
against market movements. Cash is a risk-free asset that gives companies the most 
leeway and is an important requirement for seeking future loans. Therefore, cash is no 
longer simply a balance sheet line-item that is used to purchase inventory. Instead, it is a 
risk management technique that produces more benefits despite the costs of losing a tax 
shield. After all of these years, cash is still king as this theoretical debate has shown. My 
research has produced an update to past literature and has concluded that the current 
levels of cash are formed as a hedge against volatility.  
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